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philosophy, which I have signalized, and draws some of its characteristics from the one and some of them from the other. .

I think, gentlemen, that neither of these two ways will recommend itself to us for practical adoption in the present session. As to the dogmatic method, we are not yet, as a Society, in a position to accept any philosophical theory sufficiently complete to afford us the necessary vantage ground. And as to the other method, that of treating the history of philosophy as merely a part of the general history of civilization, we are, I presume, bent, as a Society, to trace out and to use the history of philosophy with the aim, and for the end, of deriving from it light upon the great subject of our study, philosophy itself. No other ultimate aim than this is expressed by the name which the Society has adopted. Our purpose, I apprehend, is to make out, and by combining our efforts to help each other to make out, whether any Rationale of the Universe is attainable; to what degree, whether of comprehensiveness or of minuteness, such a rationale can be carried; and what system or set of principles has the best claim to be such a rationale in both respects; I mean, in respect both of the comprehensiveness of its range, and of the thoroughness and stability of its principles of explanation. Adopting, then, the position and aims of inquirers in this whole matter, and keeping this position and aim in view, let us proceed to the study of the efforts of former laborers in the same field, to gather from them what help we can towards the attainment of the one common aim, theirs and ours, a complete and true philosophy, so far as it is attainable by human powers.

THE SOURCES AND FACULTIES OF COGNITION.

TRANSLATED FROM THE POLISH OF E. TRENTOWSKI (the first volume of his *Logic*) by
I. PODBIELSKI.

Analysis of the sources and faculties of our cognition, together with its certitude and immediateness.

God, as the source of all things, is essence; the world is existence; and man is essence and existence in union. For the reason that in man essence and existence are united, it follows that in

man are found both godliness and worldliness [a divine element and a secular element].

Man, as essence, as godliness, stands in absolute unity with God. As worldliness, he stands in absolute unity with the world. This absolute unity makes possible to him the cognition of God and that of the world, and hence the cognition of the universe, or cognition in general. Without it he would not be capable of cognition.

We can demonstrate this in another way. God, the world, and man, have alike truth and knowledge for the factors of their being. Truth and knowledge unite in God and constitute His idea (*notio*). God is the first [primordial] focus [radiant-point] of the universe, or he is its perception, consciousness, and its own feeling of self, on the bosom of eternity, for this reason solely, that he is absolute idea (*notio*), that in Him truth and knowledge melt together and constitute God's selfhood or *I am*. Truth and knowledge, in the realm of nature, give rise to a Dualism. Truth is here, in nature, and knowledge is there, in God. Truth and knowledge do not unite here in the temporal nature's cognition (*notio*), and for that reason nature has no consciousness, nor its own feeling of self, its selfhood. God's creation was imperfect, because it did not have its own focus [or unity of consciousness]. God, wishing to complete it, breathed His essence into the most perfect of natural beings, or into the last being that he had created he breathed truth and knowledge by means of His idea (*notio*). And hence arose man as the being capable of cognition.

Man attains to cognition, and by this means realizes God's breath (*notio*). He is the second focus of the universe, or he is its perception, consciousness, and its own feeling of self, only because he has in himself the breath of God—that is, God's idea (*notio*)—because in him truth and knowledge melt together and constitute his selfhood or *I am*, and make him the image of God. Man, then, is capable of cognition, because he is an essence and existence; and, therefore, he constitutes the absolute unity of the universal essence and existence. Moreover, he is enabled, by the breath of God, to become the focus of his own and of all other truth and knowledge. Cognition is the specific attribute of man, it has its foundation in man, and its perfect development in the world and in God. It is, in general, like a plant striking its roots

into the earth and lifting its crown and summit toward heaven. Cognition is the bond uniting man with the creation and with its Creator—it is the end of existence returning into its beginning.

We know that man is perception, consciousness, and his own feeling of self, or that he is the focus and consciousness of the universe in time. We know also why he is so, and must be so; we know, finally, that this, and nothing else, makes him capable of cognition.

Now arises the question, upon what basis in him does this perception, this consciousness, and this feeling of self rest? On the answer to this question depends the discovery of the sources of cognition. Perception, consciousness, and feeling of self or selfhood, being the breath of God, God's idea (*notio*) in man, constitute man's being. What is this being? It is a created deity, a selfhood, or the soul. It follows that the soul or selfhood is only in man, or in the [only] being capable of cognition. Perception is of an empirical nature, consciousness of a speculative, and personality of a philosophical nature. Our selfhood is also triple: empirical, speculative, and philosophical. Perception, then, is the special attribute of empirical selfhood, consciousness of speculative, and personality of philosophical selfhood. What is the empirical selfhood? It is a body. But body is only an abstraction, a dead reality. It is a living body, or a body regarded as a total selfhood, in its external aspect. In such a body only is found the capability of perception. Upon what does this capability rest? Upon the passivity of body, upon its susceptibility and its feelings; upon the fact that it can be the looking-glass of the external world—*i. e.*, by means of the senses.

The senses, therefore, are the substratum, bearer, vehicle of perception, and, therefore, the first source of cognition. They are the eye of the selfhood, seeing the external form of all truth and knowledge.

What is the speculative selfhood? It is a spirit. But spirit is only an abstraction, a dead ideality. It is a living spirit, or a spirit regarded as the total selfhood, viewed in its internal aspect. Only in such a spirit [*i. e.*, as viewed internally] lives consciousness. Upon what does this consciousness rest? Upon the fact that spirit thinks, and knows that it thinks, that it is thinking. What is the foundation of this thinking in spirit, or what is the

faculty of pure thinking—thinking *a priori*? It is Reason. Reason, then, is the total ground of consciousness, and, therefore, it is the second source of cognition. It is the eye of the selfhood seeing the internality of all truth and knowledge.

Finally, what is the philosophical selfhood? It is the soul, as selfhood itself in itself; that is, God's breath in us, the focus of body and spirit, the core of personality, a deity. Personality, or the feeling of self, is the quality of this philosophical selfhood. And no wonder a deity, feeling itself to be deity, comes to its own feeling of self or personality. Upon what does this personality rest in the philosophical selfhood? Upon the capacity for its own feeling of self, or upon the all-including mind. All-including mind, then, is the foundation of personality, and, therefore, is the third source of cognition. It is the eye of the soul, as total selfhood seeing the basis of all truth and knowledge, seeing God's word, deity, God Himself. Therefore, only because we have the senses, reason, and the all-including mind, are we capable of perception, consciousness, and our own feeling of self or personality, and also of cognition. The senses and reason have the all-including mind for their principle and organic unity. The all-including mind is God's breath in us, or the capacity for cognition given us by God. It makes us the temporary focus of the universe and the image of God. We have, then, three sources of cognition—senses, reason, and all-including mind.

These three sources of cognition constitute relative difference, absolute indifference, and philosophical difference in indifference. It is properly the one and the same source of cognition, but regarded, first, from its external, secondly, from its internal, and, thirdly, from its fundamental side. From these sources flow certain streams, which are their powers, and are called the faculties of our selfhood. As there are three sources of cognition, so there are three classes of these faculties. Each of these classes is a system in itself, and all three together create one organic system. To the domain of the senses belong perception, memory, and the understanding (their higher powers); to the reason, judgment and imagination; and to the all-including mind, reflection and attention, as its lower powers, or precedent and dawning activities.

Wishing to facilitate the subsequent exposition of these sources

and faculties of cognition, we present them here in a systematic arrangement. There is a sacred tree growing up in our selfhood, making it the mirror of all truth and knowledge, and forming also the substratum of its capacity for cognition.

+ Body, Perceptive Consciousness.	± Selfhood = the Soul, Personality = Feeling of Self.	— Spirit, Consciousness.
a. <i>Senses</i> , the first source of cognition, and their internal focus, <i>perception</i> .	c. <i>Attention</i> , the principle of mind.	b. <i>Imagination</i> , the principle of all reasonings.
a ² . <i>Memory</i> .	c ² . <i>Reflection</i> .	b ² . <i>Judgment</i> .
a ³ . <i>Understanding</i> (Intellect).	c ³ . All-including <i>Mind</i> , the third source of Cognition.	b ³ . <i>Reason</i> , the second source of Cognition.

We will describe these sources and faculties of cognition in the most concise manner possible.

Sense (Latin, *sensus*; German, *Sinn*, *Sinnlichkeit*) is our total selfhood standing forth in its empirical externality, and opening itself to the external world of existence; it is our selfhood pervading the body, and enkindling therein physical feeling for the world surrounding us; it is a corporeal truth and knowledge, entering into contact with the universal corporeal truth and knowledge; it is our real knowing (*notio*) seeking for our real cognition.

Sense is passivity, with all that appertains to it; it is also a means of reaching wholeness, infinitude, universality, necessity, reality, affirmation, extension in space, substance, objectivity, egotism, co-existence, and perception. As the living passivity, and gifted with perception, it is the temporary mirror in which all nature sees itself, finds also its focus, its image, and its word. The empirical selfhood is on the one side, and the external truth and knowledge, belonging to all existence, on the other. These are two poles, on one great magnetic needle. Sense is the bond of the difference in indifference, or union, between the empirical selfhood and the external world existence; it is the central point in that magnetic needle. Without senses, external truth and knowledge within us would not be able to enter into contact with external truth and knowledge outside of us; these two truths and knowledges would not be able to become conscious either of their

relative difference, or of their absolute indifference, or of their philosophical difference in indifference—that is, of their harmony or mediated union.

(*To be continued.*)

THE PANTHEISM OF SPINOZA.

BY JOHN DEWEY.

The problem of philosophy is to determine the meaning of things as we find them, or of the actual. Since these things may be gathered under three heads, the problem becomes: to determine the meaning of Thought, Nature, and God, and the relations of one to another. The first stage of thought being Dogmatism, the first philosophy will be that of the common uneducated mind—Natural Realism. God, self, and the world are three independent realities, and the meaning of each is just what it seems to be. If, however, they are independent realities, how can they relate to each other? This question gives rise to the second stage of Dogmatic Philosophy, which, according to the mind of the holder, takes either the direction of Dogmatic Idealism or a Dualism with God as the *Deus ex Machina*, like that of Descartes. The reconciliation of the elements here involved leads to the third stage, where God becomes the Absolute, and Nature and Self are but his manifestations. This is Pantheism, and the view-point of Spinoza. Thought and being become one; the order of thought is the order of existence. Now a final unity seems obtained, and real knowledge possible.

The problem of philosophy being to determine the meaning of the Actual, its final test must be the completeness with which its answer agrees with and accounts for the Actual. By this we do not mean, of course, that its interpretation must agree with the common interpretation. There is certainly no shadow of reason for supposing that the metaphysic of the uneducated mind is the final one to which all metaphysic must conform. But every philosophy must answer this question: Does it provide the factors which in their development account for the Actual as it is inter-